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Abstract: 
The epistemological structure of Irish republican ideology is examined through the theoretical 
perspective of Jacques Lacan.  This paper extrapolates this position into a societal and group matrix.  The 
Lacanian imaginary is taken here as a model which can encompass the epistemological structure of 
republicanism in particular as a form or sub-set of nationalism.  I will explore the nature of Lacan‟s 
concept of the imaginary order before applying it to the construction of a republican idea of selfhood.  I 
am aware that Lacan‟s theories are essentially based on the individual self, but would contend that there 
is theoretical justification in applying them to a more societal or group concept of identity.  In 
Althusserian terms, society interpellates the next generation in its own image through socio-cultural and 
linguistic signifiers, and the epistemological structure of republican nationalism is suffused with such 
structures, and has successfully replicated itself in various individuals over a long period of time.  
Lacan‟s theories of the creation of the individual self through a form of reflection would certainly seem 
to have some place in such structures. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Perhaps the first things that need to be addressed, given the title of this paper, are the terms „republican‟ 
and „imaginaire‟.  The former term would seem to be self evident, in that it generically describes a 
political system wherein power within a state is held by the people, through their representatives.  It also 
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refers to a political system where there is a separation of power between the legislature and the judiciary.  
The two great republican examples are those of the American and French revolutions wherein a military 
overthrow of a political regime was accompanied by an intellectual and philosophical interrogation of 
notions of power and responsibility.   
  
The genesis of the term „republicanism,‟ in a specifically Irish context, can be traced to the period 
antedating 1798. Republicanism has remained a potent signifier in subsequent Irish politics, and is still 
relevant today in the form of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, Provisional Sinn Féin, the 
Continuity IRA, the Real IRA and the 32 County Sovereignty Committee. Ironically, the motto of the 
Provisionals, „tiocfaidh ár lá‟, translates as „our day will come‟, and this is the exact phrase that is used 
by Davin in his conversation with Stephen in Chapter Five of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. 
As Stephen runs through the history of failed rebellions of the past, and states his refusal to join any such 
movement, Davin replies: they „died for their ideals, Stevie….Our day will come yet, believe me‟.1  This 
verbal parallelism foregrounds the thematic and imagistic dimensions of Republican ideology as we have 
come to know it.  Literary tropes are suasively used in order to reinforce a motivated connection between 
a particular group, a whole nation and notions of temporal closure: „a nation once again‟. 
 
The imaginaire, on the other hand, is a term specific to the theory of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques 
Lacan.  It is seen as the first order of development of the human ego, before progressing into the area of 
what he calls the symbolic, namely the register of language, symbols and agreed systems of meaning. In 
a ground-breaking essay entitled „The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I‟,2 Lacan sees one 
of the seminal stages of this „construct‟ as the defining of the self in terms of a reflection. The self is 
defined in terms of misrecognition (méconaissance) of an image of itself in the mirror, a process which 
he terms the „mirror stage.‟ While initially seen as a moment which can be placed at a particular time in a 
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child‟s life, between six and eighteen months, Lacan would later see this as a structural relationship vital 
to the formation of the ego.  
  
This paper extrapolates this position into a societal and group matrix.  The Lacanian imaginary is taken 
here as a model which can encompass the epistemological structure of republicanism in particular as a 
form or sub-set of nationalism.  I will explore the nature of Lacan‟s concept of the imaginary order 
before applying it to the construction of a republican idea of selfhood.  I am aware that Lacan‟s theories 
are essentially based on the individual self, but would contend that there is theoretical justification in 
applying them to a more societal or group concept of identity.  In Althusserian terms, society 
interpellates the next generation in its own image through socio-cultural and linguistic signifiers, and the 
epistemological structure of republican nationalism is suffused with such structures, and has successfully 
replicated itself in various individuals over a long period of time.  Lacan‟s theories of the creation of the 
individual self through a form of reflection would certainly seem to have some place in such structures. 
 
In this essay, Lacan pictures a child becoming aware of its own image in a mirror, and goes on to discuss 
the „jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child‟ as it aspires to the totality of that image: 3 
This…would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is 
precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with 
the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as subject. This 
form would have to be called the Ideal-I.
4
 
The important point to note about this identification is that the image is ideal, it orients the „agency of the 
ego‟ in a „fictional direction‟; it is something towards which the ego may aspire, but which it can never 
attain. It is also an identification that has no place for anything else outside of its scopic field (the field 
where the visual dimension of desire is enacted). Lacan makes the point that the human ego is created as 
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a result of identifying with one‟s own specular image, so what seems to be individual, internal and 
unique to the individual is, in fact, the result of identification with a two-dimensional representation of 
that individual.  The „ideal-I‟ is both a fiction, and a fixed model which can never be more fully 
developed. 
 
Samuel Weber comments astutely on one particular aspect of this theory. He notes that a human being is 
able, at a much earlier stage: „to perceive the unity of an image than it is to produce this unity in its own 
body‟.5 The difficulty here is that the image is both that of the self, and also a form of alterity, in that it is 
clearly not the self. The recognition of the self is actually misrecognition, but one which exerts a 
powerful hold on the ego, as it provides the comforting sense of wholeness which the ego desires. This 
prefigures an allied sense of alienation from the image, as feelings of narcissistic aggressivity arise in the 
tension between the specular image and the real body. In other words, through the agency of desire, the 
human child sees an image that is more coherent than the actuality of its own body and proceeds to 
identify with it.  This is then taken as an image of our lifelong need to be better than we are.  So, we see 
ourselves, ideally, as thinner, cleverer, more successful, more popular than we actually are. 
 
Interestingly, Weber situates such conflicts in terms of temporality. He makes the point that for Lacan, 
the future anterior is of crucial importance in his discussion of the construction of identity, as it is 
through time that such notions are developed. Lacan himself stressed the importance of the future 
anterior in his own discussion on language and time: 
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I identify myself in language, but only by losing myself in it like an object. What is realised 
in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, or even the present 
perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for 
what I am in the process of becoming.
6
 
Lacan, Weber notes, locates the time of the subject as an „inconclusive futurity of what will-always-
already-have-been...a “time” which can never be entirely remembered, since it will never have fully 
taken place‟.7 In other words, in the mirror stage, the identification of the subject with the imago8 sets up 
a desire for imaginary wholeness in the future, a future towards which the subject strives, but which it 
will never reach. Hence, Lacan‟s vision of the imago as an „alienating destination,‟ which is reached by 
facing towards a „fictional direction‟,9 wherein the specular image „traps the subject in an illusory ideal 
of completeness‟.10 This ongoing process of captation and misrecognition is a performative through 
which the ego is created and defined.  For Lacan, narcissistic aggressivity is the result of a desire that can 
never be fulfilled. Before desire can be mediated through language and the symbolic order, it: „exists 
solely in the single plane of the imaginary relation of the specular stage, projected, alienated in the 
other‟.11 
 
What we see in Lacan‟s investigation of the mirror stage, then, is that he radically transformed a 
psychological experiment into a „theory of the imaginary organisation of the human subject‟.12 This 
stress on the imaginary as a structural ordering of human relationships is important in our discussion of 
nationalism. It begins in the mirror stage, but continues into all aspects of our lives. Elizabeth Grosz 
provides a comprehensive overview of the imaginary: 
Imaginary relations are thus two-person relations, where the self sees itself reflected in the 
other. This dual imaginary relation...although structurally necessary, is an ultimately stifling 
and unproductive relation. The dual relationship between mother and child is a dyad [two 
individuals regarded as a pair], trapping both participants within a mutually defining 
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structure. Each strives to have the other, and ultimately, to be the other in a vertiginous spiral 
from one term or identity to the other.
13
   
Here, we see the symphysis between the Lacanian imaginary and the epistemology of nationalism in 
general and republicanism in particular. At a basic level, this reflective captation of the subject by an 
image is what constitutes the imaginary order. Imaginary relationships are predominated by ambivalent 
emotions; a desire to become the image in the mirror, and, on realising the futility of this aim, a resultant 
aggressivity towards both the image, and anything which intervenes with, or blocks, the desired 
identification with that image. The image, as well as being a source of desire, is also, because it is 
fictional as well as external and can never be fully internalised, a source of hatred. The displacement of 
this hatred on all that is deemed to be outside this binary specular relationship is a possible explanation 
of the violence that seems to be inherent in practically all enunciations of nationalist ideology throughout 
history. The primary imaginary relationship for the ego is with the mother.  Child and mother are seen as 
a unity, a biologically centred reaction as, of course, child and mother were a single entity during 
pregnancy 
 
I will contend that this captation of the self by a reflected, two-dimensional image of that self, is the sine 
qua non of the epistemology of nationalism and Republicanism. An image of selfhood is set up as an 
ideal, an ideal which has a dual interaction with the temporal structures of history. The mirror in question 
here is one of language and time.  This moment of ideal fusion between self and image is often 
postulated as a mythical alpha point, an ur-beginning, from which all ideas of the race or Volk derive. In 
an Irish republican context, for example, 1798 or 1916,
14
 are such moments which seem to transcend 
time; from the unionist perspective, 1691, the date of the Battle of the Boyne, would be an analogous 
defining moment. Kevin Whelan makes the point that Daniel O‟Connell‟s Catholic nationalism also 
appealed to selective notions of history, „using an idealised past to destroy the decadent present‟.15 
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However, such moments of fusion are also postulated as a goal towards which the ethnie
16
 should aim at 
some undefined time in the future. As we will see, the discourse of nationalism abounds with variations 
of these two temporal imperatives, as peoples look to regain a lost prelapsarian past, or else to come into 
their kingdom in some golden futurity. In contemporary political discussion, this can be seen from a 
particular choice of descriptive locution.   
 
Republican spokespeople constantly refer to „the Dublin government‟ and „the London government‟ in 
their comments.  These terms have become a commonplace in the media, with both Irish and British 
broadcasters using them as norms.  However, some conceptual unpacking will reveal that these terms are 
part of the predefined mirror image of the future that is central to republican epistemology.  The term 
„Dublin government‟ is used in preference to the term „Irish government‟ because it is seen as an 
illegitimate state function which does not have jurisdiction over the „6 Occupied Counties‟ of Northern 
Ireland.  The 32 County Sovereignty Committee makes this point explicit by declaring „null and void any 
documents which usurp the sovereignty of our nation as declared in the 1919 Declaration of 
Independence‟.17  In this context, a two-dimensional image of Irishness from the past is seen as 
controlling all possible future developments of Irishness in the future, a temporal schemata which is very 
much in line with Lacan‟s conception of the imaginary.  Similarly, the „London government‟ lacks 
legitimacy in the imaginary scheme precisely because it is the occupying force in question in Northern 
Ireland, and will only be deemed „British‟ when this occupation, a temporal hiccup, is ended and „Ireland 
long a province‟ can become „a nation once again.‟  Like the images of the reflected „ideal-I‟, the „Ideal-
Ireland‟ is reified, or fixed, allowing for no deviation from the temporal path set out in the imaginary 
mindset. Only then will there be a legitimate „Irish‟ government. The fact that Republican ideology is 
suffused with personifications of Ireland as a mother figure is surely, in this context, no accident. The 
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use of racial, religious and linguistic tropes that are rooted in the individual and group unconscious, gives 
nationalist ideology a strong hold on the minds of its audience. 
 
In his study, „The Island of Ireland: a psychological contribution to political psychology,‟ Ernest Jones 
analyses the dominant image of a female personification of Ireland in terms of how the signifier „Ireland‟ 
has become particularly associated with an „unconscious maternal complex‟ (Gallagher, 1988: 1).18 Jones 
made the point that for island peoples, the associations of their native land with the ideas of „woman, 
virgin, mother and womb‟ are very strong and he went on to add that such phantasies tend to fuse „in the 
central complex of the womb of a virgin mother‟.19 
 
The many different names that have been given to a personified Ireland – Erin, Cathleen Ni Houlihan, 
Banba, Mother Ireland, the Shan Van Vocht, the Poor Old Woman
20
 – tend to demonstrate the accuracy 
of Jones‟s point, and I would largely agree with Cormac Gallagher‟s extrapolation from Jones‟s thesis 
that, in the case of Ireland, there is a strong connection between this personification and the „repressed 
primary idea of Mother, the closest of all immediate blood relatives, to which powerful unconscious 
affective interests remain attached‟.21 What this means, in effect, is that the political has become mapped 
onto the familial, with the hugely affective and emotional aspects of family relationships mapped onto 
political structures.  In Defence of the Nation, the „Newsletter of the 32 County Sovereignty Committee‟, 
for example, we find the following quotation in a section entitled „Where We Stand‟, which enunciates 
that organisations‟s credo: „the committee seeks to achieve broad unity among the republican family on 
the single issue of sovreignty‟.22  Here, the strong political and ideological differences among different 
strands of republicanism have been transposed into an internal family squabble, a rhetorical device which 
serves to naturalise republican ideology into a familial norm, with Ireland personified as a mother.  Here 
the elements of choice, argument, debate and ideology are subsumed into a naturalized familial dialectic.  
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Gallagher‟s study points us in the direction of an answer to this complicated question. Developing his 
point about the connection between the idea of Ireland and that of a mother figure, he points out that if 
nationalists unconsciously connect their actions with the „primary idea‟ of the mother: „their thoughts 
and actions will have such a compulsive force that no amount of reasoning or concessions will modify 
them‟.23 It is here, I would contend, that we approach the main epistemological dimension of the 
imaginaire. Lacan has identified desire as the most important human attribute, from the perspective of 
the development of the human ego. I will argue that desire is precisely the compulsive force, 
unconsciously driven, and oriented towards primary images and ideas, which permeates and originates 
nationalist ideology. By an analysis of Lacan‟s paradigms of the mirror stage and the imaginary order, 
we can see, at an individual level, the effects and dimensions of this desire on identity; and we can then 
go on to develop this in terms of the group identity as predicated in the nationalist imaginaire. In the 
song A Nation Once Again, this transposition from individual to group growth is framed within this 
imaginary notion of teleological nationhood.  The song begins when „boyhood‟s filer was in my blood‟, 
and proceeds through a process of political and religious development until manhood („and so I grew 
from boy to man‟) is defined in terms of participation in the creation of the once and future nation. 
 
In Lacan‟s account of the development of the ego, human identity is seen as emerging from the crossing 
of a frontier, from what he terms the „imaginary order‟ (the dyadic world of mother and child), into that 
of the „symbolic order,‟ which is concerned with symbolic systems, language being the main one (though 
both stages continue to coexist within the individual afterwards). The imaginary is defined as the „world, 
the register, the dimension of images, conscious or unconscious, perceived or imagined‟.24 Lacan‟s 
notion of the imaginary order is one wherein the human being becomes attached to an image, and 
attempts to find a wholeness and unity of meaning through a form of imitation or mimicry of this image. 
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It is the idea of the ego as being fascinated, and ultimately fixated, by its image that has such importance 
for our discussion of the modality of knowledge that is operative in, and through, nationalism. Lacan 
seems to see such mimicry as constitutive of our identity-generating process as humans. „the field of 
phantasies and images,‟ with its prototype being the „infant before the mirror, fascinated with his 
image‟,25 while Gary Leonard, in his Lacanian study of James Joyce‟s Dubliners, sees it in terms of a 
„period of time in which individuals mistake their mirror images for themselves, that is, as proof that 
they are unified and autonomous beings‟.26 As Lacan himself puts it, the imaginary is, at its core, an 
erotic relationship: „all seizing of the other in an image in a relationship of erotic captivation, occurs by 
way of the narcissistic relation‟.27 Here, he is pointing towards his theory of the importance of the image, 
or reflection, in the process of identificatory development of the ego, which he defines as a form of 
construct of self and image. 
 
The important point to note about this identification is that the image is ideal, it orients the „agency of the 
ego‟ in a „fictional direction,‟ it is something towards which the ego may aspire, but which it can never 
attain. It is also an identification that has no place for anything else outside of its scopic field. Lacan 
makes the point that the human ego is created as a result of identifying with one‟s own specular image, 
so what seems to be individual, internal and unique to the individual is, in fact, the result of an 
identification with a two-dimensional representation of that individual. Lacan‟s point here is that the ego 
is constituted: „by an identification with another whole object, an imaginary projection, an idealisation 
(“Ideal-I”) which does not match the child‟s feebleness.‟ It is this „alienated relationship of the self to its 
own image‟ that Lacan terms the imaginary.28 
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Nationalist narratives very often read as coherent and teleological, leading cohesively from past to 
future. In this sense, Lacan‟s notion of the future anterior is important as history, rather than being a 
record of events of the past, becomes a temporal mirror through which the nationalist imago is seen and 
reinforced: „the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming‟.29 The 
wholeness of the reflected image of the self becomes the goal of the ego. In the narrative of history, this 
wholeness becomes the telos or goal. In a search for such wholeness and unity, as Bhabha notes, the 
subject assumes a „discrete image which allows it to postulate a series of equivalences, samenesses, 
identities, between the objects of the surrounding world‟,30 and this brings us to the third area of 
delimitation. The driving force behind these identities is what Bowie terms: „the false fixities of the 
imaginary order‟.31 The imaginary order attempts to hypostasise (to fix in terms of underlying substance) 
and hypertrophy (to enlarge in terms of one specific dimension) the specular image of itself, and to block 
any development of this position of fixity: it is „tirelessly intent upon freezing a subjective process that 
cannot be frozen‟.32 This prioritisation of the static image, and the resultant imperative towards fixity in 
the viewing subject, necessitates relationships in nationalist discourse which are unchanging and 
foundational. In an attempt to remove itself from „the flux of becoming‟,33 the nationalist imaginaire 
insists on identifications that are as permanent as it can find, with the most obvious of these being the 
identification between a people and a place, between a language and a land, as we saw in the motivated 
description of the „Dublin‟ as opposed to the „Irish‟ government. 
 
The lococentric
34
 relationship between a people and a place, the archetypal nationalistic trope, is by its 
nature, imaginary because it is fictive. Stressing a monological and temporal essentialism, it cannot cope 
with aspects of real society which do not correspond to the ideal reflected image. The practices of 
cultural nationalism all serve to create this mirror, this delusory dyad in which nothing else exists except 
this specular definition of selfhood. The aggressivity that is a concomitant of narcissism, the child 
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expelling that which upsets the specular symmetry, is an inherent aspect of the imaginary, and also, I 
would suggest, an inherent aspect of nationalism. All that is „other‟ in terms of the imaginary selfhood 
must be expelled. Etymologically, the term „territory‟ derives both from terra (earth) and terrére (to 
frighten) which leads, as Bhabha has astutely pointed out, to territorium: „a place from which people are 
frightened off‟.35 If the people-place relationship is to enact the dyadic nature of the nationalist 
imaginary, then anything outside that dyadic scopic field must be elided. 
 
In the establishment of the ego, as we have seen, the desire for some form of identity is paramount. From 
infancy, we seek to be desired and loved by the „other,‟ a term which, as Mark Bracher notes, alters as 
we develop. Initially, at the beginning of life, this designation refers to the „mother, then both parents, 
later one‟s peers, and finally any number of bodies or figures of authority, including God, Society and 
nature‟.36 In many ways, it is the growth and development of our notion of the other that structures the 
type of identity which we develop. If the other is allowed to remain static, if it becomes hypostasised in 
an imaginary dyad, then this attenuation of the other will result in a concomitant attenuation of the 
development of the self. These master signifiers also form some of the points de capiton (anchoring 
points) which Lacan sees as necessary for normal interaction within discourse.  
 
For example, a specific narrative of the past can also be used as a binding factor in this imaginary 
relationship, as witnessed by the rhetoric of the imaginary that is to be found in the Green Book, the 
training manual of the Provisional IRA. Here, the imaginary identification of a whole people with a 
minority movement is enacted through the creation of a temporal master signifier which anchors a 
particular reading of Irish history: 
Commitment to the Republican Movement is the firm belief that its struggle both military 
and political is morally justified, that war is morally justified and that the Army is the direct 
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representatives [sic] of the 1918 Dáil Éireann parliament, and that as such they are the legal 
and lawful government of the Irish Republic, which has the moral right to pass laws for, and 
claim jurisdiction over, the whole geographical fragment of Ireland...and all of its people 
regardless of creed or loyalty.
37
  
This is the discourse of nationalism par excellence, embodying its imaginary epistemology. Time is 
frozen in a specular identification with the „Dáil of 1918,‟ a term which is a point de capiton in Irish 
republican narrative.
38
 All subsequent elections and democratic expressions of will are null and void; 
they do not correspond to the totalising image and must therefore be deemed invalid. All territory and 
people, „regardless of loyalty or creed,‟ are claimed as part of the nationalist imaginary; the chilling 
question of exactly what is to be done with those whose loyalty is not to the Dáil of 1918 being left 
unasked and unanswered. Here, the master signifier sets limits to the development of the other in the 
discourse of Irish nationalism. The development of which Bracher spoke is stunted. Instead, the passive 
narcissistic desire (the desire to be the object of the other‟s love, idealisation or recognition)39 of the 
addressees of this document (IRA members), is fixed on an other which defines itself in terms of the  
election in 1918. This is also the position of the 32 County Sovereignty Committee, whose whole raison 
d‟être is predicated on this particular point in time: „This committee solely stands to uphold the 
Declaration of Independence as proclaimed by Dáil Éireann on January 21
st
 1919‟.40 
 
Another master signifier in the above declaration is the term „belief.‟ Here there is to be no rational 
debate, or attempt to win over opponents through force of argument. Instead, all that is necessary is that 
one should believe in the moral right of the IRA to carry out its political and military actions. As Renan 
has noted, nationality has a sentimental side to it: „it is both soul and body at once; a Zollverein is not a 
patrie‟.41 In terms of the song A Nation Once Again, this pattern of the language of belief and religion is 
a central trope.  The chain of religious imagery, which I cite seriatim, functions as a narrative spine 
within the song: 
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And then I prayed I might yet see 
Our fetters rent in twain…. 
….Outshine that solemn starlight 
It seemed to watch above my head 
In forum, field and fane 
Its angel voice sang round my bed…. 
….It whispered too that freedoms ark 
And service high and holy…. 
…..For, freedom comes from God‟s right hand 
And needs a godly train 
and righteous men must make our land 
A nation once again…. 
 
Belief in the nation as an almost sacral manifestation is a central tenet.  If one believes in the nation, in 
the cause, then all further action is legitimated by this belief – the epistemological structure operative 
here is that of a dyad, the „I‟ of the song believes in the nation that is to come, and that nation, in turn, 
validates and legitimate‟s the growth of the self in the song from „boyhood‟ to adulthood: „as I grew 
from boy to man‟. 
 
Here, then, is the epistemology of the republican imaginaire: a misrecognition, a méconaissance, in 
which self and image cohere to the exclusion of all others. According to Lacan, the ego is constructed as 
the child struggles to achieve the specular image of wholeness that is observed in the mirror; an image: 
that is both accurate (since it is an inverted reflection, the presence of light rays emanating 
from the child: the image as icon); as well as delusory (since the image prefigures a unity and 
mastery that the child still lacks).
42
  
For Lacan, this specular relationship initiates the imaginary order where the self is dominated by an 
image of the self, and it seeks definition through reflected relations with this image. The nationalistic 
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ethnie is forever gazing towards a specular image that is fictional, optative (as in expressing a wish or 
desire) and of necessity, a source of aggressive impulses when it cannot be internalised. In this specular 
dyad, there is no place for a developing, growing „other,‟ as outlined by Bracher. Instead, the specular 
image is fixed in a two-dimensional realm, and all three-dimensional changes which blur the purity of 
this image are alien, and must be purged. 
 
This imaginary reflection is the driving force behind all nationalistic discursive formulations. Thus, the 
deistic skeptical Enlightenment thinker, Wolfe Tone, is captated
43
 by the nationalist imaginary into a 
quasi-Catholic martyr, who died for his people in a salvific act of redemption. For the IRA, the ebb and 
flow of the signifying chain of Irish history is punctuated by a temporal master signifier – the 1918 Dáil 
Éireann parliament – which renders insignificant and meaningless all prior and subsequent electoral 
contests and democratic processes. When these refuse to validate the imaginary nationalistic vision of 
Ireland embodied in the 1918 Dáil, they are simply elided from the historical narrative structure. As 
Lacan tellingly put it: „history is not the past. History is the past in so far as it is historicized in the 
present‟,44 and the ideological and emotive elements which govern this historicisation are those of the 
nationalist imaginaire. 
 
Hence, the image of a subject being captated by a reflection, which is both idealised and at the same time 
frozen, is a paradigm for the identificatory processes of nationalism. The captation of the child by his or 
her reflection is an analogue of the captation of a people by their nationalist mirror-image. The dual 
nature of the scopic field between an ethnie and the projection of its identity is central to nationalism. 
That there is no third party in this scopic bijection is another cogent factor. The identification is mutually 
fulfilling: there is no room for anything or anyone else. Such is the mindset of the IRA declaration which 
sees itself as having: „the moral right to pass laws for, and claim jurisdiction over, the whole 
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geographical fragment of Ireland.‟ Here we see a fusion of territory with a notion of religious warrant, as 
an essentially political movement expresses itself in terms that are profoundly religious in tenor: 
„belief...moral right.‟ The specular imaginary deals with identities that exist outside of its scopic field in 
an acquisitive way: the IRA here encompasses „all of its [Ireland‟s] people regardless of creed or 
loyalty‟.45 The choice for any other form of identity existing outside the nationalist imaginary is simple: 
leave the territory, or else be absorbed into the nationalist mentaliteé. 
 
Lacan has made the point that: „[d]esidero is the Freudian cogito‟,46 and has stressed the primacy of 
desire as a motive force in the construction of our humanity. Such desire is central to the creation of the 
nationalist and republican imaginaire.  If there is to be a core definition of nationalism qua nationalism 
then surely it must focus on the mode of creation of the ethnic group, or on the methods used in 
imagining the identity of the community in question, or on the rhetorical and suasive strategies used in 
terms of creating nationalistic sentiment. The modality of these creations or inventions, what Anderson 
terms „the style in which they are imagined‟,47 is crucial if we are to come to any understanding of how 
nationalism utters and fashions itself. To quote Bennington: at „the origin of the nation, we find a story 
of the nation‟s origin‟,48 and there can be no doubting that this reflexive form of narrative is an important 
constituent of the epistemology of nationalism. Narratives create the myths of nationalism, and these are 
both protean and similar in that they feature a telling to the self of the self, a telling which, in the process, 
is performative in that it is creative of that self, at both conscious and unconscious levels.  
 
Bennington‟s focus on narrative, I think, allows us to overcome the antinomies already observed in terms 
of the problematics of defining nationalism. Every culture defines itself through a process of narrative 
imagination, a re-telling of stories about its own past which reaffirms the ritual unities of the culture in 
question. For example, Irish people remember the 1916 Easter rebellion as a nodal or central point in the 
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political and cultural reaffirmation of Irishness per se. Around this period, and for some time before, the 
major political parties, or their precursors, were founded, and the Gaelic, Celtic, Irish Language and Irish 
Literary revivals were set in motion. The Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association were set up, 
and the gradual adequation between the nationalist movement, both political and cultural, and the 
Catholic church came into being. This period of colonial upheaval – with the almost standard attendant 
processes of nationalist consciousness-raising, independence movement, armed rebellion, war of 
independence/liberation and an ensuing civil war – became part of the process of a national imaginary, 
defining Irishness as it emerged from the colonial shadow of Britain. This whole period, or more 
correctly, the narrative enculturation of this period, became a nodal point, or point de capiton from which 
particular notions of Irishness were traced. 
 
Such a process is necessary for cultural definition, but there is always a danger that such culturally 
sanctioned categories may become reified into some form of epistemological orthodoxy which forms a 
hypostasised centre of identity. As Richard Kearney has noted, such a process of „ideological 
recollection of sacred foundational acts often serves to integrate and legitimate a social order‟.49  
However, he goes on to cite a warning note sounded by Paul Ricoeur, who points out that such a process 
of reaffirmation can be perverted „into a mystificatory discourse which serves to uncritically vindicate or 
glorify the established political powers.‟ Ricoeur‟s point is essentially that in such instances the symbols 
of a community become fixed and fetishised; they serve as lies‟.50 Ricoeur has noted that imagination 
can function as two opposite poles. At one pole is the confusion of myth with reality brought about by a 
„non-critical consciousness‟ which conflates the two into a societal „given.‟ At the other end of the axis, 
where „critical distance is fully conscious of itself,‟ „imagination is the very instrument of the critique of 
reality,‟ because it enables „consciousness to posit something at a distance from the real and thus produce 
the alterity at the very heart of existence‟ (Kearney, 1998: 147).51 
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I would argue that the narrative structure of nationalism is clearly allied to Ricoeur‟s initial pole, that of 
the confusion of myth with reality through a „non-critical consciousness.‟ Such a narrative structure 
functions mainly at an unconscious level in culture and society, creating structural effects in terms of 
ethnic and racial stereotypes. Logic, reason and critical thinking allow us to discriminate between the 
value of stories as fictions, and their constative, or truth-telling status. However, by functioning at an 
unconscious level, through formal and informal apparatuses of communication, narratives and myths 
create a powerful drive, through which nationalist ideology can be disseminated. They create an 
imaginary selfhood which is reflected back into society as an ideal form of identity. 
 
The stock example of such a process is Nazi Germany in the 1930s, but there are multifarious examples 
to be found of the unconscious effect of narratives that are uncritically equated with constative discourse. 
In an Irish context,
52
 perhaps the locus classicus of this type of nationalist narrative operating at a pre-
critical, unconscious level is Patrick Pearse‟s rewriting of the history of the United Irish rebellion of 
1798. Pearse was a central figure in the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a sub-grouping within the Irish 
Volunteers, who organised a rebellion against the British Government in 1916.
53
 In his efforts to create a 
narrative of nationalist resistance to British rule in Ireland, Pearse specifically set out to „remember‟ the 
1798 rebellion in highly specific terms. 
 
The 1798 rebellion was led by Theobald Wolfe Tone.
54
 Tone, a product of the French Enlightenment, 
had little time for religion, and saw the aim of his organisation, The United Irishmen, as the creation of a 
country where the terms Protestant, Catholic and Dissenter would be subsumed under the common name 
of Irishman.
55
 Tone himself, as Marianne Elliott has observed, was a deist, „who disliked 
institutionalised religion and sectarianism of any hue.‟ More importantly in the present context, she 
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makes the point that, based on his writings, he had „no time whatsoever for the romantic Gaelicism that 
has become part of Irish nationalism‟.56 Hence, if Pearse wished to create a seamless narrative wherein 
Tone was a historical nationalist avatar, and a Pearsean precursor, he would seem to have some factual 
historical difficulties with which to contend. 
 
His response to these difficulties is a classic exemplum of what I have termed nationalist epistemology. 
In an oration given at the grave of Tone, in Bodenstown, County Kildare, in 1913, Pearse enfolded Tone 
in the following narrative structure: 
We have come to one of the holiest places in Ireland; holier even than the place where 
Patrick sleeps in Down.
57
 Patrick brought us life, but this man died for us. He was the 
greatest of Irish Nationalists.…We have come to renew our adhesion to the faith of Tone: to 
express once more our full acceptance of the gospel of Irish Nationalism which he was the 
first to formulate in worldly terms. This man‟s soul was a burning flame, so ardent, so 
generous, so pure, that to come into communion with it is to come unto a new baptism, into a 
new regeneration and cleansing.
58
  
Here there is no attempt to commemorate the historical Wolfe Tone, the „child of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment‟ whose hope was that Enlightenment rationality would supplant what he regarded as 
„superstitious beliefs‟.59 Instead, Tone is suasively captated into Pearse‟s own vision of Irish history. It is 
not accidental that Anderson has noted a „strong affinity‟ between nationalist and religious imaginings.60 
Indeed, he has made the valid point that the dawn of the age of nationalism coincides with the dusk of 
religious thought,
61 as both tend to work with some form of „sacred text.‟ The notion of a sacred text is 
important here, as the response to such a text is not that of close reading, or of some form of rational 
critical engagement; rather is it an acceptance, a belief, and a ready acknowledgement of the „truth‟ that 
is revealed by this text. 
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His frame of reference is directed at an audience whose unconscious is saturated with Roman Catholic 
religiosity. The rhetorical device polyptoton
62
 is used to cement the adequation of Tone with Saint 
Patrick in the opening line. This adequation transforms Tone from an historical figure, subject to the 
veridical discourse of history, into a mythico-religious one, comparable to the legendary Saint Patrick, 
about whom comparatively little is known, apart from his spectacular religious success. The connection 
between the two, the hinge upon which the whole rhetorical structure turns, is based on this lococentric 
comparison in terms of the holiness of a specific place. This connection is then developed in the 
contradiction that while Patrick „brought us life,‟ a phrase which clearly implies religious life, Tone „died 
for us.‟ By now, the adequation has done its work, and the unconscious religious background fills in any 
blanks in the narrative. In Catholic teaching, the notion of sacrifice, the one for the many, is a central 
tenet. The adequation between Tone and Saint Patrick is now elided and a stronger connection is set up. 
Given the religious frame of reference (reinforced by the lexical field of the paragraph: „faith‟; gospel‟; 
„soul‟; „communion‟; „baptism‟; „regeneration‟; „cleansing‟), the notion of someone dying „for us‟ 
implies an adequation between Tone and Christ, and at a broader level, between nationalism and 
religion. 
 
For Pearse, and we must keep in mind his notion of Tone as the first to formulate in worldly terms the 
gospel of Irish nationalism, there is something quasi-sacred about the nation. Régis Debray, in an attempt 
to study the constituent factors of the historical nation-state, has traced, in nationalism, the process 
whereby „life itself is rendered untouchable or sacred. This sacred character constitutes the real national 
question‟.63 The teleology of Pearse‟s rhetorical transformation of the people into their own Messiah is to 
render them „immortal and impassable.‟ Nationalistic selfhood creates a people, a Volk, which 
transcends time and death. The religious overtones of this message, allied to strong unconscious 
influences, combine to create a linguistic and suasive dimension to the epistemology of nationalism 
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which can never be fully examined in any analysis which is not grounded in literary, linguistic, and 
psychoanalytic techniques. This, I would argue, is why the already discussed definitions will always fail 
to analyse the workings and imperatives of nationalism. It is only by looking at its modality of 
expression, and its epistemological status, that we can come to clearer perceptions about its nature. 
 
Let us observe Pearse on the steps of the General Post Office in the centre of Dublin on Easter Monday 
1916, when he inscribes his act of rebellion against the British under the rubric of a nationalistic, 
rhetorical reading of Irish history:  
Irishmen and Irishwomen: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she 
receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her 
flag and strikes for her freedom.
64
  
Through the use of a rhetorical structure largely underpinned by transcendental imagery, Pearse avoids 
the discourse of reason or of political debate, and instead appeals to the unconscious signification of the 
powerful images of „God,‟ the „dead generations‟ and the notion of Ireland as a mother, calling her 
children to her flag.  
 
The phantasy invoked here is telling. As Easthope has noted, phantasy turns ideas into narratives,
65
 and 
the proclamation of a provisional government, while encapsulating a certain social doctrine: (universal 
suffrage, and guarantees of „religious and civil liberty, equal rites and equal opportunities to all its 
citizens‟),66 is largely premised on a narrative structure which creates and defines selfhood in its own 
terms. Keeping in mind his notion of the people as their own messiah, it is noteworthy that the 
proclamation concludes by stressing the sacrificial, and ultimately salvific, nature of this struggle. He 
concludes: 
 22 
We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose 
blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will 
dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, 
by its valour and discipline, and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for 
the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.
67
  
The unconscious, pre-critical element that I maintain is a central tenet of the epistemology of 
nationalism, is evident here through close reading. The proclamation seems to come to a logical 
conclusion. Pearse‟s prayer is that the Irish nation must prove itself worthy of the „august destiny‟ to 
which it is called, and this seems to make the act of rebellion almost preordained. Of course, on looking 
back to the beginning of the proclamation, we find that it is „through us,‟68 namely the splinter group 
within the Irish Volunteers, who defied their own command structure in order to undertake the Rising, 
that the personified notion of Ireland initially summoned „her children to her flag‟ and struck „for her 
freedom.‟69 Consequently, the seemingly impersonal „august destiny‟ is, in fact, part of a suasive 
rhetorical device which exemplifies the circularity and reflexivity of nationalist epistemology. The „we‟ 
who are called into service as the children of a personified Ireland, are the very „we‟ who have 
personified that notion of Ireland in the first place. In terms of an imaginary scene, which is altered in 
order to fulfil a wish for the subject, this whole exercise can be described as a locus classicus of 
phantasy, a phantasy which is constitutive in terms of defining the national subjectivity in question. This, 
in turn, produces an alteration from the communal and socially structured relationships of politics into 
the natural and organic relationships of the family: it is not a case of politically inspired revolutionaries 
deciding to fight for social or ideological aims, instead, it is children coming to the defence of their 
mother, an act which in itself requires neither explanation nor warrant. 
 
The suasive and rhetorical effect of this process, when repeated, is to allow a linguistic performative to 
achieve a constative function. Here, myth and reality are fused in a nationalist imaginaire, and the mutual 
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reflection of one in the other combines to create a narrative structure which is impervious to the 
conventions of political and veridical discourse. This narrative structure is also constitutive of what we 
might term nationalist identity, given that it reflects a particular type of subjectivity that is deemed to be 
Irish. No matter how much evidence of Wolfe Tone‟s attitude to religion is instantiated in biographies, 
he is still seen as part of a Catholic, Gaelic, nationalist pantheon, as narrated by Pearse, and it is to his 
grave in Bodenstown that the Provisional IRA have trooped in pilgrimage every year. The fact that their 
sectarian murder campaign over the past thirty years was the antithesis of everything that Tone stood for, 
is not seen as any impediment to this process. What Pearse has been attempting is a narrative which will 
create trans-rational, unconscious, ethnic bonds between the past and the present. The facts of history are 
not part of such a discourse; they are only of value in selected instances, and if they reinforce the agenda 
of the narrative: they are creative of an identification, they are creative of an „us.‟ 
 
However, such valorisation or validation is actually defined relationally inasmuch as essentialist 
characteristics are actually predicated on a difference from otherness. For there to be an „us,‟ then there 
must be a „them‟ who are, by definition different from „us.‟ This definition of the self promotes a desire 
for racial, linguistic, ideological, territorial and cultural purity which, at one end of the spectrum, 
validates a desire for socio-cultural identification and self-definition, and at the other, posits a desire to 
differentiate one‟s own group from others, and by extension, a related desire to keep other groupings 
outside one‟s native territory, be that territory actual or psychic, and be that desire conscious or 
unconscious.  
 
 The Ulster loyalist, for example, believes that he or she is British, and that Ulster (comprising six 
counties, since partition in 1922), as a political entity, is stable and viable. The Ulster republican, on the 
other hand, refuses to recognise the state of Northern Ireland, and instead sees Ulster (nine counties, part 
 24 
of the original quinary provincial divisions of Ireland), as part of the whole island of Ireland. The leader 
of the Orange march at Drumcree, during the summer of 1996, believed that even as these marchers 
defied the legal ban imposed by Sir Hugh Annesley, the Chief Constable of the RUC (the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary), he was obeying some higher notion of „Britishness,‟ and was able to invoke the Queen in 
support of the actions of his followers and himself: „we are the Queen‟s subjects, who wish to walk the 
Queen‟s highway.‟70 
 
If the Queen of England is the titular head of the British legislature, then, by extension, the Chief 
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary is acting in her interests and at her behest through the British 
parliament at Westminster. From a logical or rational perspective, his enforcement of the law regarding 
the prohibition of parades from marching in a particular locality is validated by British legal and 
governmental writ. To claim that by breaking the Queen‟s law, one is, in some way demonstrating a 
higher form of loyalty to that Queen, is patently absurd. But of course, as we have seen in the case of 
Pearse, nationalist narrative is performative as opposed to constative, and this claim of a higher loyalty 
validates the Orange Order‟s sense of itself as some form of latter-day chosen people, who are 
proclaiming a „true‟ notion of „Britishness‟ that only they can understand. Just as Pearse saw Tone as 
formulating the „gospel of Irish Nationalism in worldly terms,‟ so the Orange Order sees itself as 
revealing the „truth‟ about notions of loyalism and Britishness in a similar manner.  
 
The militant Republicans who bombed Omagh in the Summer of 1998, similarly believed that their 
action would in some way facilitate the coming into being of a united Ireland. While claiming that it is 
non-sectarian, the IRA, in all its manifestations, has pursued overtly sectarian policies, by targeting 
people and premises purely on the basis that they are Protestant, and by extension, unionist and loyalist 
in political persuasion.
71 
Both traditions blend religion and politics, seeing their own creed as true and the 
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other as heretical, and both traditions express their respective identities through a matrix of cultural 
signifiers: murals, graffiti, songs and icons, a matrix which is constitutive of powerful identificatory 
unconscious phantasies.
72
 
 
If this type of politically motivated violence is to be removed from an Irish context, thee is a need for a 
clear understanding of the nature of republicanism in a specifically Irish context.  I would argue that Irish 
republicanism is very different from that of France or the United States in that it is a more essentialist 
political formulation, with none of the philosophical enquiry that underpinned the French and American 
revolutions.  In terms of its mode of knowledge, of how it sees itself and its place in contemporary 
culture, Irish republicanism exemplifies all of the tenets of the Lacanian imaginaire, and only by 
progressing towards a more fluid definition of selfhood and alterity will it ever be able to acknowledge 
change and diversity as possible benefits to a changing dialectic.  With the advent of Sinn Fein in the 
political spectrum of both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, an advent which offers de facto 
recognition of the legitimacy of both states, and by definition of the position of the Ulster Unionist 
population, some measure of progress has been achieved.  If that is to be maintained the idea of  a 
nationhood that is temporally bound in the past and future anterior must give way to a more fluid 
concept, a concept that is enshrined in a different epistemology of Irishness, as enunciated by Daniel 
O‟Connell: „No man has the right to set a boundary to the onward march of a nation. No man has the 
right to say: „Thus far shalt thou go, and no further.‟  This perspective on Irishness is one which the 
republican needs to embrace if it is ever to develop beyond the republican imaginaire. 
 
A NATION ONCE AGAIN 
 I 
When boyhoods fire was in my blood 
I read of ancient freemen 
For Greece and Rome who bravely stood 
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Three hundred men and three men 
And then I prayed I might yet see 
Our fetters rent in twain 
And Ireland long a province be 
A nation once again 
CHORUS 
A nation once again 
A nation once again 
And Ireland long a province be 
A nation once again 
 II 
And from that time through wildest woe 
That hope has shone a far light 
Nor could loves brightest summer glow 
Outshine that solemn starlight 
It seemed to watch above my head 
In forum, field and fane 
Its angel voice sang round my bed 
A nation once again 
 III 
It whispered too that freedoms ark 
And service high and holy 
Would be profaned by feelings dark 
And passions vain or lowly 
For, freedom comes form Gods right hand 
And needs a godly train 
And righteous men must make our land 
A nation once again 
 IV 
So, as I grew from boy to man 
I bent me to that bidding 
My spirit of each selfish plan 
And cruel passion ridding 
For, thus I hoped some day to aid 
Oh, can such hope be vain 
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When my dear country shall be made 
A nation once again.  
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